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Assessing the Value of Ventures: Crowd 
Investors vs. Sophisticated Investors 
 
 
 
Marco Bade1 
 
Abstract 
Recent regulatory approaches in crowdfunding democratize capital markets. Adverse 
wealth effects may arise because of information asymmetry. Firoozi et al. (2017) argue 
that crowdfunding has wealth-reducing effects on crowd investors because they 
systematically assign less value to good ventures, and more to bad ventures. This paper 
aims to take a more differentiated perspective by incorporating two dimensions of 
uncertainty determining ventures’ value. It further takes into account that different 
investor types learn different information. This yields new findings concerning the 
assessment of venture value by crowd investors and sophisticated investors. Crowd 
investors’ may be able to better assess venture value, even though they have inferior 
information processing skills. This may enable crowd investors to make better 
investment decisions, compared to sophisticated investors. 
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I. Introduction 
Crowdfunding is a novel way of financing new ventures. Instead of addressing a small 
group of sophisticated investors to raise funds, ventures try to obtain funding from a 
large group of (unsophisticated) investors. Each individual provides only a small 
amount of money (Belleflamme and Lambert, 2014). Recent regulatory approaches, 
such as the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012 in the U.S., aim to 
democratize capital markets in order to facilitate access of entrepreneurs to funding 
from crowd investors. However, the democratization of capital markets goes hand in 
hand with reduced investor protection, and thus bears the risk of adverse wealth effects. 
In the academic debate, little consensus has been found yet given the fact that this is a 
very young field of research. Agrawal et al. (2013) explain that crowdfunding faces two 
problems related to asymmetric information: hidden information (adverse selection), 
and hidden action (moral hazard). Ahlers et al. (2015) provide the first empirical study 
in this context, and show that the provision of more detailed information about risk 
and uncertainty by entrepreneurs can positively affect the probability of successful 
funding. Courtney et al. (2017) propose that signals about project quality and founder 
credibility may also mitigate information asymmetry, and thus increase the likelihood 
of attaining funding. 
To date, even less attention has been paid to adverse wealth effects among 
different types of investors. Firoozi et al. (2017) are the first to investigate wealth-
reducing effects of crowdfunding on crowd investors, resulting from information 
parity. The authors argue that there is substantial private information parity between 
accredited traditional investors (for example, banks) and crowd investors. That is, small 
crowd investors have fewer financial resources and less investing experience than large 
accredited traditional investors do. The analysis of Firoozi et al. (2017) shows that 
crowd investors assign less expected value to good ventures, and more to bad ventures, 
compared to accredited traditional investors. This results from crowd investors’ general 
disadvantage in processing signals disclosed by ventures.  
However, this general assumption seems quite critical and may result in 
misleading conclusions. It is indeed conceivable that crowd investors have inferior 
information quality on average. Nevertheless, they may have information-related 
advantages in certain areas. For example, crowd investors are typically also consumers 
of the new product generating additional utility from community benefits, which are 
tied to the future consumption experience (e.g., Belleflamme et al., 2014), and social 
interaction realized through the participation in crowdfunding platforms or 
communities (e.g., Gerber et al. , 2012; Belleflamme et al., 2013, 2014). This means, 
crowd investors truly care for the product. Thus, they may have superior skills in 
assessing product quality or future demand for the product. This enables them to 
properly interpret signals about product-related uncertainty, even though they may be 
unable to interpret other signals. More sophisticated investors, such as venture 
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capitalists or banks, may still have better information quality, and an advantage in 
processing signals about other sources of uncertainty.  
Therefore, in order to portray a more realistic setting, the present paper 
incorporates two dimensions of uncertainty, and takes into account that different types 
of investors (crowd investors and sophisticated investors) may learn different 
information. This yields new and more differentiated findings with respect to the 
assessment of venture value by crowd investors and sophisticated investors. Hence, 
this paper contributes to the emerging academic debate on (adverse) wealth effects 
related to crowdfunding. In addition, it helps policy makers to further develop an 
appropriate framework for crowdfunding.  
II. The model 
Types of ventures 
The economy in this model is populated by two types of ventures 𝑖 ∈ {𝐺, 𝐵} and two 
groups of investors 𝑗 ∈ {𝑠, 𝑐}. One of the two ventures is good (index 𝐺), whereas the 
other venture is bad (index 𝐵). At date t=1, the final value 𝑉𝑖 of venture 𝑖 is determined 
by two sources of uncertainty: 
 
𝑉𝑖 = 𝛽1𝜇𝑖,1 + 𝛽2𝜇𝑖,2, (1)  
 
where both ventures share common weights 𝛽1,2 > 0. These parameters represent the 
weights of the two sources of uncertainty for the overall value of the venture. In other 
words, 𝛽1,2 captures to what extend a venture’s risk depends on dimension 1 and 
dimension 2. Below, I will elaborate on this in more detail. Consider two ventures 
producing a very similar or complementary product, and thus facing a similar 
composition of uncertainty. 𝜇𝑖,𝑛, where 𝑛 ∈ {1, 2}, can be high (𝐻𝑖 > 0) or low (𝐿𝑖 =
0) with equal probability. 𝜇𝑖,𝑛 can be interpreted as stochastic shocks determining the 
profitability of ventures. Each shock captures one dimension of uncertainty. The sum 
of all shocks determines the ventures’ total risk and value. It is assumed that 𝐻𝐺 > 𝐻𝐵, 
meaning that the good state of the good venture (high profitability) is better than the 
good state of a bad venture. This simply captures that venture 𝐺 is more profitable 
than venture 𝐵, even though both ventures being in a good state.  
The rationale of two-dimensional uncertainty is as follows. Ventures are 
regularly exposed to multiple sources of uncertainty, for example, demand for the firm's 
products, production technology, idiosyncratic developments, macroeconomic 
influences, management skills and experience, entrepreneurial competence, risk of 
fraud, etc. In the present model, I subsume these risks into two categories. It is assumed 
that 𝜇1 captures all sources of uncertainty related to the entrepreneur or entrepreneurial 
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team starting the venture (management-related risk), and 𝜇2 captures product-related 
risks. Depending on the specific type of product, the weights of management-related 
and product-related risk may differ. For example, if a venture offers a radically 
innovative product, the most crucial source of uncertainty may be related to realizability 
or implementabilty of the product, and to consumers’ acceptance, and thus demand 
for the product. In this case, 𝛽2  is high. In contrast, if the venture aims to position 
itself in a more mature market segment, the success of the venture rather depends on 
the experience and skills of the entrepreneur or management to gain competitiveness 
(high 𝛽1).  
Of course, there are many other sources of uncertainty, which cannot be 
collapsed under these two umbrella terms. For example, uncertainty around social 
trends, economic conditions, political infrastructure, legal context, etc. Nevertheless, 
the approach of modelling two dimensions of uncertainty is sufficient to capture the 
main idea of the model, which is to show that different types of investors may learn 
different information. Note that the considering n-dimensional uncertainty does not 
change the results as long as one assumes that different types of investors have 
information about different risk factors.   
 
Types of investor groups 
The two types of investors differ in terms of information processing skills. There is a 
group of sophisticated investors (index 𝑠), such as venture capitalists, who have 
superior skills in assessing the quality of business plans, management skills and 
experience, etc. Such investors, who regularly provide management-consulting services, 
may have high levels of expertise in terms of management. Previous research has 
shown that entrepreneurial or managerial experience is a crucial factor determining 
early performance of young ventures. Hence, it may also be the most important driver 
of venture capitalists’ investment decisions. Traditionally, venture capitalists put much 
weight on entrepreneurial experience when evaluating the attractiveness of new 
ventures (Stuart and Abetti, 1990). Based on a survey among 100 venture capitalists, 
MacMillan et al. (1985) identify the criteria, which are the most important drivers of 
venture capitalists’ investment decisions. Five of the ten most important factors are 
directly related to the characteristics of the entrepreneurs themselves. Consistent with 
this, Hsu (2007) finds evidence that prior entrepreneurial experience increases both the 
likelihood of venture capital funding and venture valuation. These findings stress 
venture capitalists’ strong focus on the management/entrepreneur-related dimension 
of ventures, which seems to dominate dimensions related to the market, product, or 
strategy. This is why I assume that sophisticated investors have the exclusive ability to 
process information related to the ventures’ management.  
Besides the sophisticated investors, there is a group of unsophisticated 
investors (the crowd, indexed by 𝑐) with inferior information processing skills, but 
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better sense of product quality. Crowd investors’ activities are much more driven by 
the product-related dimension. They actively engage in product development, quality 
reassurance, experience sharing, and joint consumption (Ouwersloot and Oderkerken-
Schroder, 2008). Hence, crowd investors interact, share their contributions, and 
observe others’ contributions and experiences. They build up their own contributions 
using other crowd investors’ suggestions to end up with better overall solutions (Lévy, 
1997; Surowiecki, 2004; Brabham, 2008a, 2008b; Schwienbacher and Larralde, 2010).2 
This facilitates learning of product quality (Gerber et al., 2012; Belleflamme et al., 2013, 
2014). Hence, I assume that crowd investors are superior in processing product-related 
information.  
At date t=0, ventures signal whether they are good or bad, and disclose 
information regarding management, information about technology and the product, 
marketing and industry-specific information, and other relevant operational and 
financial strategies within the business plan. Thus, all investors receive a set of public 
signals about the two dimensions of uncertainty. Given different experience and skills 
to process these signals, the two groups of investors update their beliefs with different 
precision. Based on the discussion above, it is assumed that sophisticated investors are 
only able to process public information (set of signals 𝑌𝑠) about management-related 
risks (𝜇1), whereas the crowd only learns product-related information, that is, a set of 
signals 𝑌𝑐 about 𝜇2.  Information quality of sophisticated investors is defined as 
follows: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑠 = 𝐻𝑖|𝜇𝑖,1 = 𝐻𝑖) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑠 = 0|𝜇𝑖,1 = 0) = 𝛾𝑠, (2)  
 
where 𝛾𝑠 ∈ [
1
2
, 1]. If information quality is low (𝛾𝑠 =
1
2
), the probability of having a 
correct signal is 50 percent. If 𝛾𝑠 = 1, this means that the accuracy of information 
processing is 100 percent. Analogously, crowd investors’ information quality is given 
by: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑐 = 𝐻𝑖|𝜇𝑖,2 = 𝐻𝑖) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑐 = 0|𝜇𝑖,2 = 0) = 𝛾𝑐 . (3)  
 
Note that, in order to nest this model in previous literature (e.g., Firoozi et al., 
2017), I assume:  
 
𝛾𝑠 > 𝛾𝑐 . (4)  
 
                                                 
2 In the literature, this mechanism creates the so-called “wisdom of crowds“.  
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This captures that sophisticated investors have fundamentally superior skills in 
processing information in general, compared to less experienced average crowd 
investors. 
III. Results 
Investor expectations 
After receiving signals at date t=0, investors try to assess the ventures’ future value, 
which eventually guides investment decisions. Note that these investments are not 
explicitly modeled in this paper. The expectations of sophisticated and crowd investors 
about the good venture’s future value are given by: 
 
𝐸𝑠(𝑉𝐺) = 𝛽1 ∙ 𝛾𝑠𝐻𝐺⏟
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝜇1
+ 𝛽2 ∙
𝐻𝐺
2⏟
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝜇2
=  
𝐻𝐺
2
(2𝛽1𝛾𝑠 + 𝛽2), 
(5)  
 
𝐸𝑐(𝑉𝐺) = 𝛽1
𝐻𝐺
2⏟
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝜇1
+ 𝛽2 𝛾𝑐𝐻𝐺⏟
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝜇2
=  
𝐻𝐺
2
(𝛽1 + 2𝛽2𝛾𝑐). 
(6)  
 
In determining expectations about ventures’ future value, investors use all 
information available to them, and their skills to process information. Recall that, 
typically, different types of investors have different skills to process information, and 
focus on different types of information. Hence, in this model, these skills only affect 
the expectation of one of the two sources of uncertainty because each type of investor 
only has information about one source of uncertainty. For example, sophisticated 
investors’ expectation of the good venture’s future value 𝐸𝑠(𝑉𝐺) is determined by two 
components: The first component represents their expectation about management risk 
(𝜇1) conditional on their (positive) information about 𝜇1. Given a positive signal, in 
expectation, this component is in a good state 𝐻𝐺  with probability 𝛾𝑠, which represents 
the skills to process information about management-related uncertainty of 
sophisticated investors. In other words, given positive information about venture 𝐺, 
sophisticated investors expect the good venture to have a good management with 
probability 𝛾𝑠. This component is weighted by 𝛽1 measuring the impact of 
management-related factors. The second component is the unconditional expectation 
about the other source of uncertainty (𝜇2), weighted by 𝛽2. Given sophisticated 
investors have no information about product-related factors, they expect 𝜇2 to be in a 
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good state 𝐻𝐺  with probability 
1
2
. Analogously, the two groups of investors expect the 
bad venture’s value to be: 
 
𝐸𝑠(𝑉𝐵) = 𝛽1(1 − 𝛾𝑠)𝐻𝐵 + 𝛽2
𝐻𝐵
2
=  
𝐻𝐵
2
(2𝛽1(1 − 𝛾𝑠) + 𝛽2), (7)  
 
𝐸𝑐(𝑉𝐵) = 𝛽1
𝐻𝐵
2
+ 𝛽2(1 − 𝛾𝑐)𝐻𝐵 =  
𝐻𝐵
2
(𝛽1 + 2𝛽2(1 − 𝛾𝑐)). (8)  
 
The idea is that investors today seek to invest into ventures with good prospects 
and high expected future value. With the same initial value, the venture with the higher 
expected future value represents the more attractive investment. In the absence of 
further information, investors can mostly only make their investment decisions on the 
basis of expectations and perceived risk. 
 
Benchmark case 
Before presenting the main results, I consider the case 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 as a benchmark, which 
yields results consistent with previous literature. Given 𝛽1 = 𝛽2, investors’ 
expectations about the good venture’s value can be rewritten as follows:  
 
𝐸𝑠(𝑉𝐺) =  
𝐻𝐺
2
(1 + 2𝛾𝑠), (9)  
 
𝐸𝑐(𝑉𝐺) =  
𝐻𝐺
2
(1 + 2𝛾𝑐). (10)  
 
Crowd investors have less optimistic expectations about the value of the good 
venture than sophisticated investors, that is: 
 
𝐸𝑠(𝑉𝐺) > 𝐸𝑐(𝑉𝐺) (11)  
 
𝐻𝐺
2
(1 + 2𝛾𝑠) >
𝐻𝐺
2
(1 + 2𝛾𝑐), (12)  
 
because 𝛾𝑠 > 𝛾𝑐. On the other hand, however, crowd investors are more optimistic in 
forecasting the value of bad ventures: 
 
𝐸𝑠(𝑉𝐵) =  
𝐻𝐵
2
(𝛽(3 − 2𝛾𝑠)), (13)  
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𝐸𝑐(𝑉𝐵) =
𝐻𝐵
2
(𝛽(3 − 2𝛾𝑐)), (14)  
 
and thus: 
 
𝐸𝑠(𝑉𝐵) < 𝐸𝑐(𝑉𝐵) (15)  
 
𝐻𝐵
2
(𝛽(3 − 2𝛾𝑠)) <
𝐻𝐵
2
(𝛽(3 − 2𝛾𝑐)), (16)  
 
because 𝛾𝑠 > 𝛾𝑐.  
 
In this benchmark case, the two dimensions of uncertainty have equal weights. 
Thus, information about 𝜇1 and 𝜇2 is equally valuable, and information advantages of 
sophisticated investors solely arise from information quality (𝛾𝑠 > 𝛾𝑐). Given that 
sophisticated investors have superior information processing skills, they have an overall 
advantage over crowd investors in assessing the ventures’ value. This results in adverse 
wealth effects for crowd investors because they assign a smaller expected value to good 
ventures, and a larger expected value to bad ventures, compared to sophisticated 
investors. Thus, crowd investors tend to invest less than sophisticated investors in good 
ventures and more in bad ventures (Firoozi et al., 2017).   
 
Key results 
In this subsection, I present the main results of the model by showing that, depending 
on 𝛽1,2, crowd investors may assign more expected value to good ventures, and less 
expected value to bad ventures, even though having inferior information processing 
skills. Regarding the good venture, comparison of expectations of sophisticated and 
crowd investors yields the following condition: 
 
𝐸𝑠(𝑉𝐺) < 𝐸𝑐(𝑉𝐺) (17)  
 
𝐻𝐺
2
(1 + 2𝛾𝑠) <
𝐻𝐺
2
(1 + 2𝛾𝑐), (18)  
 
if and only if: 
 
2𝛽1𝛾𝑠 + 𝛽2  < 𝛽1 + 2𝛽2𝛾𝑐 (19)  
 
𝛽1
𝛽2
<
2𝛾𝑐 − 1
2𝛾𝑠 − 1
. (20)  
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Compared to sophisticated investors, crowd investors assign more expected 
value to good ventures if and only if the relative weight of 𝛽1 is sufficiently small. Given 
𝛾𝑐 < 𝛾𝑠, the right hand side of the above condition is smaller than one. This implies 
that 𝛽1 necessarily needs to be smaller than 𝛽2. Similarly, in the case of assessing the 
bad venture’s value, it can be shown that 𝐸𝑠(𝑉𝐵) > 𝐸𝑐(𝑉𝐵), if and only the above 
condition is satisfied. Hence, crowd investors have less optimistic expectations about 
the bad venture’s value if 𝛽1 is sufficiently small.  
This implies that, even though having worse information quality, crowd investors 
tend to invest more than sophisticated investors in good ventures, and less in bad 
ventures, if the impact of product-related sources of uncertainty, measured by 𝛽2, is 
high. Thus, if the ventures’ value depends on the product-related dimension, rather 
than the management-related dimension, crowd investors may have an information 
advantage over sophisticated investors having better information quality.  
IV. Concluding remarks 
Startups are a leading source of economic growth and job creation. For example, the 
Business Dynamics Statistics show that startups create most of the new net jobs in the 
US. Startups are responsible for all net job creation during most years considered in 
the statistics. Young (aged less than one year) of existence add an average of 3 million 
jobs per year. Existing firms (aged one year and older) create one-tenth the jobs created 
by startups. Considering the job destruction rates, existing firms are usually net job 
losers (e.g., Kane, 2010; Haltiwanger et al., 2013). Yet, startups still face many 
difficulties. This is why policy makers around the world are currently updating existing 
regulations, and developing and implementing new regulatory frameworks for startups 
(e.g., Belleflamme and Lambert, 2014). One recent regulatory approach is the JOBS 
Act of 2012, which aims to incorporate smaller investors, such as crowd investors, into 
capital markets. However, the democratization of capital markets bears the risk of 
adverse wealth effects at the expense of crowd investors. As shown by Firoozi et al. 
(2017), and in the benchmark case in this model, crowd investors with inferior 
information processing skills may inefficiently invest less in good ventures, and more 
in bad ventures, compared to sophisticated investors. This calls for more protection of 
crowd investors. 
However, the findings from the extended setting in this paper suggest that this 
is not generally valid. Therefore, policy makers need to take a more differentiated 
perspective before implementing hasty investor protection measures. The present 
model demonstrates that the exact opposite is also possible as crowd investors may 
have an information advantage over sophisticated investors, for example, in terms of 
the product-related factors, which enables crowd investors to better assess ventures’ 
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expected value, even though they have inferior information quality. This may enable 
crowd investors to make better investment decisions, compared to sophisticated 
investors. This is consistent with the hypothesis that markets (in this paper represented 
by the crowd) may be superior to intermediaries (in this paper represented by 
sophisticated investors) in evaluating projects (Allen and Gale, 1999). To be clear, this 
paper assumes crowd investors to have inferior skills to process information, but to be 
superior to sophisticated investors if they simply learn information about factors, which 
are more relevant for venture value. Thus, the present paper suggests that the 
hypothesis is true if, for example, the product-related dimension dominates the 
management-related dimension of the venture. 
The present paper thus argues against the proposition that crowdfunding may 
be wealth-reducing only for crowd investors due to inferior information processing 
skills. However, it would go too far to recommend that crowd investors should not be 
protected based on this finding. It does not matter who benefits at what cost. Instead, 
in order to avoid adverse wealth effects among different types of investors, regulators 
should promote precise and reliable disclosure of all venture-related information in 
order to level the playing field among investors (e.g., Hazen, 2012; Heminway, 2014). 
The disclosing firms need to take into account the different experiences and skills to 
process public information (as also featured in the present model) among investors. 
Furthermore, regulators should obligate crowdfunding platforms to make available and 
maintain communication channels for investors in order to facilitate information flows 
among investors. Funding portals offer excellent regulatory access. In addition, the 
establishment of minimum standards for due diligence by the crowdfunding portals 
would make sense. Such due diligence could provide background checks on the 
entrepreneurial team of the venture, the competitive situation in the respective market, 
or simply the product quality. This could help investors with inferior skills to assess 
multiple dimensions of venture value. Lastly, better investor education and tests with 
the aim to clarify for investors the risks of investing in young ventures could reduce 
the gap in terms of both accessing and processing information relevant for investments 
(Kloehn et al., 2016). All of these measures might reduce information asymmetry and 
thus help avoid adverse wealth effects. For a deeper understanding of the issues 
emerging from the findings in this paper, future research should endogenize, for 
example, the information production of investors, and the allocation of weights of the 
different dimensions determining ventures’ payoff and risk structure.  
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